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Introduction to Rahl Symposium
Joel Davidow*
This Symposium deals with one of the central questions in James
Rahl's illustrious academic career-how to preserve and improve inter-
national competition. That issue can be viewed as one of competition
policy, trade policy, or antitrust enforcement. This Symposium deals
only with the third topic, but the first two issues set the legislative con-
text, which is often crucial.
I. COMPETITION POLICY
Each nation decides the extent to which it will allow or encourage
competition in each sector of its economy. Decisions concerning state
ownership of enterprises, state licensing, government procurement pol-
icy, regulatory policy, and antitrust policy will all have important effects.
For instance, one state may choose to have a single national airline
owned by the government. Another state may allow the existence of two
or more airlines, but regulate their prices, services, and relations with
competitors. A third state may allow a free market in airline service,
subject perhaps only to safety regulation.
In the above example, each of the three states presents a different
picture as an international competitor. These differences are likely to
affect each state's conception of the amount and type of international
airline competition which is desirable for its interests. The state which
owns an airline is unlikely to be unwilling to submit its enterprise to the
risks of all-out competition. Even the state which encourages airline
competition at home may not favor it abroad if other states protect their
carriers by means of ownership or regulation.
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II. TRADE POLICY
States can limit competition through trade measures in two ways.
First, they can, subject to GATT rules (or in disregard of them), protect
their enterprises from competition by means of tariffs, quotas, or other
protectionist measures. Second, they can, and do, enforce rules of unfair
competition which are stricter than their domestic antitrust rules. States
which encourage international trade cases often limit competition by
means of voluntary restraint arrangements, orderly marketing agree-
ments, and anti-dumping settlements which stabilize prices. Some of
these arrangements virtually require the formation of cartels; others
make cartels superfluous.
III. ANTITRUST RULES AND INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT
We turn now to the central issue of this Symposium, namely the
actual or potential effect of antitrust enforcement on international com-
petition. Our examination presumes, as it realistically must, that there
will not be an internationally applicable antitrust law in the foreseeable
future. In 1980, the U.N. General Assembly agreed on a set of principles
and rules for the control of restrictive business practices. However, these
rules, like all other resolutions of the General Assembly, have no binding
force on states or enterprises.
The U.N. guidelines state that enterprises should avoid cartel prac-
tices which unduly restrain competition and have adverse effects on in-
ternational trade. The principles applicable to states provide that nations
or regional groupings should adopt, improve, and effectively enforce leg-
islation for the control of restrictive business practices. It is further pro-
vided that states should seek to prevent or control restrictive business
practices within their competence which adversely effect international
trade.
Despite the unanimous adoption of this U.N. resolution, only about
35 of the 155 or so member states of the United Nations have antitrust
laws of any kind. Those 35 countries include about 20 of the developed
market economy countries, which are members of the Organization for
Economic Co-Operation and Development ("OECD"), and more than a
dozen developing countries, particularly large ones such as Argentina,
Brazil, Korea, and India. Antitrust laws have not been deemed relevant
by governments of socialist countries and are extremely rare in countries
at early stages of economic development. These statistics may be mis-
leading, however, in that antitrust laws do exist in nations which account
for over 75% of world trade.
Even in countries which have strong antitrust laws and which en-
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force them regularly and effectively (a clear minority of all countries hav-
ing antitrust laws), there is virtually no acceptance, despite international
resolution of the type quoted above, that any nation is obligated to en-
force its laws for the benefit of parties affected in another nation. This
point can be illustrated first by presuming a domestic transaction, such as
a merger. If, for instance, Boeing and Lockheed wished to merge, the
transaction would be subject to the normal jurisdiction of the U.S. Fed-
eral Trade Commission or Justice Department. If those agencies chose
to allow the merger, on some rationale such as the failing company de-
fense or the attainment of needed efficiencies, there is no serious possibil-
ity that U.S. enforcers could be convinced nevertheless to prevent the
transaction because foreign commercial aircraft buyers would prefer two
U.S. sellers rather than one.
There are rare instances in which a foreign state could apply its anti-
trust law to prevent the joining of local subsidiaries, even though it has
no way to prevent the off-shore merger of the parent companies. This
limited relief was obtained by the United States in preserving the inde-
pendence of the Ciba and Geigy subsidiaries in the United States, while
the parent companies merged in Switzerland. If, however, all or most of
the relevant productive activities take place offshore, preservation of sep-
arate local subsidiaries may have very little competitive effect.
The most ambitious effort yet to project the interests of one state
into the domestic antitrust policies of another is the revised version of
Section 301 created by the U.S. Omnibus Trade Act of 1988.1 That law
provides, among other things, that the president can take protectionist
action to retaliate against any goods from a state that injures U.S. inter-
national trading interests by the purposeful non-enforcement of its anti-
trust laws. Of course, many questions spring to mind concerning what
such a principle can or should mean in practice, and about its essential
fairness. Can, or should, the U.S. president determine that the Japanese
Fair Trade Commission should have prosecuted a particular cartel, with-
out the United States conducting its own factual investigation and deem-
ing itself an expert on Japanese anti-monopoly law? Is it fair to penalize
a country with a weak or unenforceable antitrust law more severely than
a state which has no such law, and which trades through a state
monopoly?
When conduct in a state is aimed solely at foreign markets, that
state will usually conclude that it has no substantive jurisdiction over the
conduct. The state may conclude that its legislature and courts have no
I Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107, 1164-
68 (1988).
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duty to judge the legality or acceptability of conduct aimed at foreign
markets, or even that it would be inappropriate under international law
to exercise such jurisdiction. This is the position taken by the Commis-
sion of the European Community ("Commission") in enforcing Common
Market antitrust law, and the position of the U.S. Congress in enacting
Title IV of the Export Trading Company Act of 1982.2
It follows from the above analysis that if three U.S. firms conspire to
raise prices together in sales to France, such concerted action will not
violate U.S. antitrust law. Conversely, the Commission would not attack
a European price fix aimed at U.S. consumers. A central question of this
Symposium is whether the situation described above is an optimum one,
or even a tolerable one. An initial argument that the situation is tolera-
ble is that the affected country has the right to use its own law to protect
its own consumers.
This proposition rests on two subsidiary assumptions, which are
usually true. First, it assumes that states will merely permit or approve
export cartels or other outward-bound concerted conduct, rather than
compel such conduct or have the government monopolize the export of
the product. Given mere permission or approval, the defenses of "for-
eign compulsion" or "act of state" will not apply, and the conduct will be
subject to applicable antitrust law. Second, the existence of an adequate
remedy in the affected country presumes that that nation or group of
nations uses an "effects test" to give itself jurisdiction over offshore con-
duct aimed at its consumers. The United States reiterated in 1982 legis-
lation that its Sherman Act applies to any offshore conduct having a
direct, substantial, and foreseeable effect on U.S. commerce.3 In the re-
cent Woodpulp case, the European Court of Justice embraced a similar
test -for the Common Market.'
Thus far, the situation seems clear, rational, and satisfactory. On
further analysis, however, nothing is very clear, and the situation is only
sometimes satisfactory. A state victimized by offshore price fixing or bid-
rigging may be unable to obtain personal jurisdiction over the defend-
ants. If the products are sold FOB the country of origin, there may not
even be jurisdiction over the goods, which will usually be in the hands of
innocent purchasers when they reach the affected country. Moreover,
the target country may have difficulty acquiring information about the
2 Pub. L. No. 97-290, Title I, §§ 101-104, 96 Stat. 1233-35 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4003
(1982)).
3 Pub. L. No. 97-290, Title IV, §§ 401-03, 96 Stat. 1246 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982)).




price fixing or the bid-rigging, and may be unable to obtain hard evidence
to use in a prosecution in its own courts.
If the country from which price-fixed goods are shipped is unwilling
or unable to prosecute outward-bound cartels, it has sometimes been as-
sumed that its minimum obligation is to assist the antitrust enforcers of
the victimized nation. There are OECD resolutions which appear to
commit nations to such cooperation, and the United States has bilateral
agreements with Germany, Canada, and Australia to the same effect.
Nevertheless, there is less to this cooperation than the agreements imply.
Most antitrust agencies have no authority to investigate a transaction
that does not affect their country, so they would usually possess knowl-
edge of outward-bound activity only when it is combined with domestic
cartel activity they are investigating. Also, secrecy laws in most coun-
tries regarding antitrust investigative files prohibit government officials
from disclosing detailed confidential information to foreign officials. It
would appear under U.S. law that U.S. antitrust officials would disclose
only their general conclusions or suspicions, but not the relevant evi-
dence, unless it is public information or otherwise lacks legal protection.
To make matters worse, a substantial group of nations, including the
United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, France, The Netherlands, and
South Africa, have enacted legislation to block cooperation with U.S.
antitrust enforcers regarding local conduct aimed at the United States. It
does not appear that such legislation will be repealed in the near future.
Is there any basis then for being content with the present state of
affairs or hopeful about the future? Certain real-world factors make the
situation somewhat less unsatisfactory than it seems. First of all, most
companies selling a lot of products to a major consuming country eventu-
ally desire to establish a physical presence there, in order to engage in
promotion, distribution, or manufacturing. Thus, the pure offshore car-
tel immune from jurisdiction is a relatively rare phenomenon.
Secondly, most export cartels selling from a single nation lack mar-
ket power when competing offshore. For example, an export association
handling 60% of U.S. phosphate production might only account for 20%
of all phosphate being offered for sale in international commerce. If so,
there is little reason to expect that such an association will be able to
command a supra-competitive price. Under the per se rule used in do-
mestic U.S. antitrust enforcement, such a cartel could not defend itself
on the grounds that it lacks power to raise prices. This aspect of the per
se rule, however, is really one of convenience for prosecutors and does
not mean that joint selling arrangements with small market shares are
really an economic danger. It follows that national export cartels are
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likely to be of significant concern only in regard to those few products
that are obtainable from only a single nation. Of course, a coalition of
national export cartels, such as the one which was challenged under the
Woodpulp case, will create a greater distortion of world trade. Such
multi-national coalitions, however, are difficult to organize, control, hide,
justify, or make immune from jurisdiction.
IV. CONCLUSION
Creating a relatively cartel-free world will require a combination of
competition policy (privatization, deregulation, etc.), trade policy, and
effective antitrust enforcement. In this whole picture, the export cartel is
but a tiny piece. Control of such outward-bound practices will continue
to rest primarily with the purchaser states, which must insist on the prin-
ciples of transparency, effects doctrine, and full antitrust cooperation. In
return, purchaser states probably should employ a modified rule of rea-
son, market power/price effect test to avoid challenging mere export
joint ventures which have no market power.
